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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over the pleadings pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Standard of Review.
This is an appeal from summary judgment in favor of Defendant Farmers Insurance

Exchange ("Farmers"). "To determine whether the trial court properly granted summary
judgment, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, affording those legal
conclusions no deference." In "reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."
Ault v, Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 787 (Utah 2002).
B.

Preservation of Issues in the Trial Court.
The following issues were preserved for review by Farmers summary judgment in the

trial court: (1) did the trial court correctly determine the "regular use" exclusion is not
ambiguous; and (2) did the trial court correctly determine that the "regular use" exclusion bars
coverage.
Valentine's argument that underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage follows the individual
and, therefore, coverage applies regardless of the vehicle being driven is being raised for the first
time on appeal.1

The court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it
is one not relied on below." Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
Defendants submit that U.C.A. §§31A-22-302 and 31A-22-305 are determinative of the
issues in this case. (See Addendum for full text.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Court.
This action arises out of Plaintiff Nicole Valentine's ("Valentine") claim for underinsured

motorist (UIM) benefits for injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred on
December 6, 2000. After receiving the policy limitsfromthe tortfeasor's insurance carrier,
Valentine made a demand for UIM benefits under her parents' policy with Farmers Insurance
Exchange ("Farmers").
After investigating the claim, Farmers denied coverage based on the "regular use"
exclusion in the UIM provision of the policy. On January 8, 2003, Valentine wrongfully filed a
Complaint captioned in the Fourth Judicial District Court in the Third Judicial District Court
alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (R. 12.) Valentine also filed a First Amended
Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court on April 4, 2003. (R. 21.) Realizing that the
matter was improperlyfiledin the Third Judicial District Court, Valentine filed a Motion for
Change of Venue on April 10, 2003 (R. 22), and the accompanying Memorandum in Support on

2

April 11, 2003 (R.25.) By a June 3, 2003 Order granting Valentine's Motion for Change of
Venue, the matter was transferred to the Fourth Judicial District Court (R. 32.)
On July 10, 2003, Farmers answered Valentine's First Amended Complaint and filed a
Cross-Claim for Declaratory Relief (R. 72.) The Cross-Claim for Declaratory Relief requested
the court determine that the "regular use" exclusion applied to bar coverage for Valentine's claim
for UIM benefits.
On July 15, 2004, Farmers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 113) and
Memorandum in Support (R. 155) requesting the court find that the "regular use" exclusion
applied to bar coverage for the UIM benefits being claimed by Valentine. In addition, Farmers
argued that the "regular use" exclusion did not violate public policy.
Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on September 10,2004, with the
court determining that the "regular use" exclusion was not ambiguous and that it precluded
coverage for UIM benefits. (R. 207.) On November 29, 2004, the case was transferred to the
American Fork Department. (R. 209.) On January 13, 2005, the Order granting summary
judgment was entered in favor of Farmers, finding that the "regular use" exclusion was not
ambiguous and barred coverage for UIM benefits. (R. 214.)
The Notice of Appeal was filed on February 11, 2005. (R.217.) On March 22, 2005,
Valentine's deposition was made part of the record. (R. 224.)

3

B.

Statement of Facts
In October of 2000, Nicole Valentine began working for Frank Edwards Company as a

parts runner. She was there approximately 2 months when the accident happened. (R. 224, N.
Valentine Depo: 11:16-25; 12:1-11; 15:18-25.)
On December 6,2000, Plaintiff Nicole Valentine was involved in a motor vehicle
accident while working as a parts delivery driver for Frank Edwards Company (Parts Plus). At
the time, she was driving a Chevy pick-up truck provided by Frank Edwards Company. (R. 224,
N. Valentine Depo: 12:1-8; 19:25; 26:19-25; 27:1-6; 28:10-22; 87:6-9.)
During regular business hours, the keys to the vehicle were left in the ignition of the truck
to allow employees to get in and out quickly to do their deliveries. At the end of the day, the
vehicle was locked and the keys were placed in a basket in the office. In the morning, Ms.
Valentine would pick up the keysfromthis basket and proceed with her day's tasks. (R. 224, N.
Valentine Depo: 27:7-15; 39:22-25; 40:1-13.)
Nicole Valentine drove the Chevy pick-up truck most of the time. When she was not
driving this particular truck, she drove one of three others that were owned by Frank Edwards
Company and used to deliver parts. Gas for the vehicle was paid with a Frank Edwards credit
card. (R. 224, N. Valentine Depo: 27:16-25; 28:1-4; 41:10-13.)
Valentine would drive her personal vehicle to travel to andfromwork. She would leave
her personal vehicle in the parking lot for her entire shift, except when she used it for a half an
hour during lunch. She would only use this particular truck unless her employer took it on his
4

lunch hour or if there was a problem with the truck, then she would use another Frank Edwards
vehicle. (R. 224, N. Valentine Depo: 27:16-25; 28:1-17; 29:1-16.)
Valentine worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and was paid every other week. Each
morning, she would clock in, pull the parts and load them in the back of the pick-up truck to do
her deliveries. (R. 224, Valentine Depo: 31:1-10; 32:13-20; 34:20-22.)
On December 6, 2000, the day of the accident, she was at the end of her shift and was
making her last delivery. She was in tlje Chevy pick-up assigned by the company, heading south
on State Street, delivering a part to Tunex in Provo. She acknowledged she was driving the
Chevy pick-up which was furnished for her "use on the job" when she was involved in a rear-end
collision. (R. 224, N. Valentine Depo: 41:23-25; 42:1-25; 43:1-25; 44:1-22; 45:14-25; 46:1-9;
91:21-25; 92:1-7.)
After the accident, she drove the vehicle back to Frank Edwards and drove her personal
vehicle home. At the time of the accident, Valentine was residing with her parents. (R. 224, N.
Valentine Depo: 25:24-25; 26:1-10; 53:23-25; 54:22-23.)
As a result of this accident, Valentine settled with the tortfeasor and filed a claim for
Workers Compensation Benefits. She is now making a claim for UIM benefits under her
parents' policy with Farmers. It is undisputed that she was an insured under this policy. (R. 19,
20.)
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Farmers denied coverage based on the "regular use" exclusion. Specifically, that the
vehicle being driven by Valentine in the course and scope of her employment was not an insured
vehicle under the policy because it was not described in the declarations and was provided for her
"regular use" on the job. As such, there is no coverage. (R. 60, 70.)
RELEVANT POLICY PROVISIONS

DEFINITIONS
Your insured car means:
1. The vehicle described in the Declarations of this policy or
any private passenger car or utility car with which you
replace it. You must advise us within 30 days of any
change of private passenger car or utility car. If your
policy term ends more than 30 days after the change, you
can advise us anytime before the end of that term.
2.

Any additional private passenger car or utility car you acquire
ownership of during the policy period, provided that:
a.
b.

You request that we insure it within 30 days of the acquisition,
and
As of the date of the acquisition, all private passenger cars and
utility cars you own are insured with a member company of the
Farmers Insurance Group of Companies.

Ownership will include the written leasing of a private passenger or
utility car for a continuous period of at least six months.

5.

Any other private passenger car, utility car or utility trailer not
owned by or furnished or available for regular use by vou or a family
member. This includes such vehicles while rented by you on a daily
or weekly basis. But no vehicle will be considered as your insured
6

car unless there is a sufficient reason to believe that the use is with
permission of the owner, and unless it is used by you or a family
member. (Emphasis added.)

PART I - LIABILITY
Exclusions
12.

Bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of any vehicle other than your insured car, which
is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or a
family member.

PART II - UNINSURED MOTORIST AND UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE
Coverage C-l Underinsured Motorist Coverage
Subject to the Limits of Liability we will pay all sums which an insured
person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury
sustained by the insured person while occupying your insured car.
If other than your insured car, underinsured motorist coverage applies
only if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle
covered under the terms of this policy.

Additional Definitions Used in This Part Only

3.

Underinsured motor vehicle means a land motor vehicle when:
1.

The ownership, maintenance or use is insured or bonded for bodily
injury liability at the time of the occurrences; and
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2.

Its limit for bodily injury liability is less than the amount
of the insured person's damages.

An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle:

(b)

furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family
member,... (Emphasis added.)

Other Insurance

However, in no event will the limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage
for two or more motor vehicles be added together or stacked to determine the
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident.

ENDORSEMENT ADDING REGULAR AND FREQUENT USE
EXCLUSION TO PART II
Uninsured Motorist Coverage (and Underinsured Motorist Coverage if
applicable) does not apply to damages arising out the ownership,
maintenance, or use of any vehicle other than your insured car . . . which
is owned by or furnished or available for the regular use by you or a
family member. (Emphasis added.)
(R. 39, 47-48, 50).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Case law interpreting the "regular use" exclusion applies to both liability and UEM
coverage. This is because the liability and UIM sections have the same "regular use" exclusion,
thus "the same classes of people are provided coverage under both provisions to the same
extent." Cruz v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 12 P.3d 307, 312 (Colo. App. 2000).
8

Case law from other jurisdictions has found that this "regular use" exclusion is not
ambiguous. Utah has not specifically addressed this issue, but in Mann v. Preferred Risk Mut.
Ins. Co., 382 P.2d 884 (Utah 1963), the "regular use" exclusion was applied to bar coverage. As
such, it is reasonable to assume that the court found the phrase "regular use" was not ambiguous.
(See also Hill v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 888 P.2d 138, 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1994.)
The court correctly ruled that the "regular use" exclusion applied, finding that Valentine
was not entitled to UIM benefits. This position is supported by the case law cited and relied
upon by Farmers.
Case law, the policy and statutory language supports Farmers' position that UIM
coverage follows the vehicle, not the individual. This is to ensure that the risk assumed is
commensurate with the premiums paid.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
"REGULAR USE" EXCLUSION IS NOT AMBIGUOUS
Farmers is addressing Valentine's arguments advanced in her sections entitled "The
Regular Use Clause," "Some Interpretations of the Meaning of 'Regular Use,'" "The Phrase is
Ambiguous," and "Alternate Views: the Phrase is NOT Ambiguous." Utah case law supports
that this phrase is not ambiguous. Mann v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., supra, and Hill v.

9

Farmers Ins, Exch., supra. Further, the Farmers policy language follows that of the UIM statute.
Therefore, Valentine's attempts to establish an ambiguity are without merit.
A.

The Term " Regular Use" Is Not Ambiguous
Two Utah cases, Mann v. Preferred Risk Mut, Ins, Co,, supra, and Hill v. Farmers Ins,

Exch., supra, address the "regular use" exclusion. Neither case specifically addresses whether
the exclusion is ambiguous, but the court in both cases made a determination that there was no
coverage based on this exclusion. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the court found that
the "regular use" exclusion was not ambiguous.
This position is supported by case law from other jurisdictions as well. When faced with
interpreting the phrase "regular use," the courts noted:
The words are not unusual and their meaning is well known in common parlance.
It is not a matter of ambiguity that causes courts to struggle with this phrase.
Courts struggle with its application because each case must be decided upon its
own facts and circumstances, and therefore, its application is a struggle. Its
meaning is not. Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, 681 P.2d 15, 20 (Kan.
1984) (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the phrase is not ambiguous; rather, it is the application which "depends upon the
facts of a particular case" that is problematic. Bringle v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 169 N.W.2d
879, 883 (Iowa 1969). See also Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra; International Service Ins.
Co. v. Walther, 463 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Kenney v. Employers' Liability
Assur. Corp., 214 N.E.2d 219, 221 (Ohio 1966); Vern v. Merchants Mut. Casualty Co., 118
N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (N.Y. 1952); Grange Ins. Ass'n v. MacKenzie, 694 P.2d 1087, 1089 (Wash.
10

1985); Eddy v. Fidelity and Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 116 P.2d 966, 969 (Wash. 1989);
Abbott v. General Accident Group, 693 P.2d 130,133 (Wash. App. 1985); O'Brien v. Halifax
Ins. Co. of Mass., 141 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla. App. 1 Dist 1962). Unlike cases from other
jurisdictions, the application of the facts in this case is not difficult and clearly establishes that
the "regular use" exclusion applies to bar coverage.
B.

Valentine Cannot Establish an Ambiguity
1.

An Alternate Interpretation of the Phrase Does Not Create an Ambiguity.

Valentine, to support her position, selects cases which interpret the phrase "regular use"
differently. However, Utah case law supports and Valentine fails to recognize that "[t]he
language of a contract is not necessarily ambiguous merely because a party urges a different
meaning that is more in accordance with its own interests." Larsen v. Overland Thrift & Loan,
818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Ut. App. 1991).
For example, the "unfettered ability to regularly use a vehicle according to his/her whims,
needs or desires," American States Ins. Co. v. Tanner, 563 S.E.2d 825, 833 (W. Va. 2002);
"expressed or implied understanding with the owner of an automobile that the insured could have
the use of the particular automobile or perhaps any automobile of the other at such times as he
desired if available," George B. Wallace Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 349 P.2d 789, 792
(Or. 1960); the "continuous use; uninterrupted normal use for all purposes; without limitations as
to use; and customary use as opposed to occasional use or special use," Travelers Indem. Co. v.

11

Hudson, 488 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Ariz. App. 1971); Central Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DePinto, Id. 20;
and the "steady uninterrupted use for all purposes and without limitation," Columbia Mut. Ins.
Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 905 P.2d 474, 478 (Alaska 1995), are interpretations of the
phrase advanced by different courts. Yet, these courts did not find the phrase "regular use" to be
ambiguous. As such, an ambiguity cannot be created by merely showing that various courts
interpreted the phrase differently. Thus, Valentine's argument is without merit.
2.

None of the Cases Valentine Relied Upon to Show Ambiguity are Applicable.

Valentine also relies on case law to support her position that this phrase, "regular use," is
ambiguous. Tillotson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 637 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Ark. 1982); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 334 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio App. 1974); Ricci v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 290 A.2d 408 (R.I. 1972); and Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Ward, 517 P.2d 966, 969 (Wash. 1984).
These cases are, however, all factually distinguishable.
In Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra, a distinction was made between the
"regular use" language in a family automobile policy versus a garage policy, and is not applicable
to the facts of this case. Similarly, in Ricci v. US. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, the court was
of the opinion that it was the application of the term, rather than the term itself, that was
problematic. Specifically, the court determined that since the car was not made available to the
plaintiff most of the time, it would be deemed sporadic and occasional use and, as such, was not
an automobile "furnished for the regular use of the plaintiff." Id. 415. Dairyland Ins. Co. v.
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Ward, supra, involved whether the insured had notice of the existence of the "regular use"
exclusion.
Tillotson v. Farmers Ins. Co., supra, is the only case cited by Plaintiff that found the
language ambiguous but, again, the court seemed to focus on the application to the facts. This
position is supported by General Agents Ins. Co. of America v. People Bank & Trust Co., 854
S.W.2d 368, 369 (Ark. App. 199) and Green v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 57 F. Supp.2d 729 (W.D.
Ark. 1999), wherein the court did not focus on whether the language was ambiguous, but on the
application to the facts in rendering its decision.
3.

Use of the Prepositions "the " and "by " Do Not Create an Ambiguity.

Lastly, Valentine attempts to create an ambiguity by looking at various prepositions and
articles and concluding that these make the phrase "furnished for the regular use" ambiguous.
Specifically, Valentine focuses on the word "the" in the phrase "available for the regular use by
you or a family member." Valentine additionally argued that the preposition "by" rather than
" o f after "owned by or furnished or available for the regular use," also creates an ambiguity.
Again, this is not supported by any case law. Specifically, with regard to the word "the,"
Valentine attempts to argue that this "cross[es] the line into legal ambiguity." However, the
word "the" in that location does not change the meaning of the phrase in any way. More to the
point, Plaintiff does not cite any case law to support this proposition.
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With respect to this claim that "by" rather than "of after "owned by or furnished or
available for the regular use" creates an ambiguity, is not supported by Cruz v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, supra, cited by Valentine. Rather, the Colorado Court held that this was an
unreasonable interpretation because "by" modified "regular use." Accordingly, Farmer's use of
the words "the" and "by" in the "regular use" exclusion do not make the provision ambiguous.
As such, Valentine's argument is without merit.
POINT II
THE REGULAR USE EXCLUSION APPLIES TO BAR COVERAGE
The court correctly held that the "regular use" exclusion applies and that Valentine is not
entitled to UIM benefits. Valentine never addresses this. She never distinguishes the cases cited
by Farmers applying the "regular use" exclusion but instead, without citing any case law in
support, argues that the cases relied upon by Farmers interpreting the "regular use" exclusion
involve liability coverage, not UIM coverage, and are therefore inapplicable to the present case.
However, because the liability and UIM provisions have the same "regular use" exclusion,
suggests the "same classes of people are provided coverage under both provisions to the same
extent." Cruz v. Farmers*Ins. Exchange, Id. 312. As such, the case law interpreting this
exclusion applies to both liability and UIM cases. Given that the purpose of the "regular use"
exclusion is the same, that is to prevent the insured from insuring one vehicle with the
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expectation of coverage on all vehicles without considering the risk and paying a corresponding
premium, indicates there is no distinction between cases that involve liability vs. UIM coverage.
Valentine's reference to U.C.A. §31A-22-305(10)(a), as amended in 2003, was not in
effect at the time of this loss, is not retroactive and, therefore, is not relevant. She refers to this
amendment to show that the phrase "regular use" has been deleted and, as such, the exclusion
should not apply.
In support of its position that the "regular use" exclusion bars UIM coverage for
Valentine, Farmers refers to case law addressing three categories under which the "regular use"
exclusion bars coverage. The first category are cases where it was argued that the term "regular
use" includes both business and personal use; the second category are cases where the party took
an incidental side trip and argued that it invalidated the "regular use" exclusion and; the third
category are cases where the party did not always drive the assigned vehicle. In all of those
situations and circumstances, the courts have found that the "regular use" exclusion was not
ambiguous and did bar coverage.
A.

"Regular Use" Does Not Require Both Business and Personal Use
There are jurisdictions where it has been argued that "regular use" means the vehicle is

used both for business and personal use. In other words, the position taken is if the vehicle is
only used for one purpose, i.e. business use and not personal use, then it is not excluded by the
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"regular use" provision. However, that position is the minority and the better reasoned approach
supports a finding that both business and personal use is not required.
In Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, the plaintiff was a police officer driving a
vehicle that was assigned to him for his "regular use" when he was involved in an automobile
accident. As a result of that accident, he sustained injuries and eventually settled his claim for
the policy limits. He then made a demand for underinsured motorist benefits under his wife's
insurance policy with Farmers. Farmers denied coverage, relying on the "regular use of another
vehicle" exclusion. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff maintained that
this exclusion did not apply because neither he nor a family member owned the vehicle he was
driving when he was injured. Plaintiff argued that because the vehicle he was driving was
furnished by the police department, it was not furnished for "regular use" by him or a family
member.
In addressing this issue, the Colorado Court of Appeals noted that "regular use"
provisions generally allow coverage for the occasional infrequent use of a non-owned
automobile, without requiring payment of additional premiums; distinguishing this from
circumstances where automobiles are "regularly used" by a driver that is not listed under the
policy and for which a premium is not paid.
The Colorado Appellate Court reasoned that "such exclusions provide coverage for the
occasional use of a vehicle not insured under the policy without incurring additional premium,
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but exclude coverage for a vehicle that the insured or a family member uses on a regular basis
without a corresponding premium charge." Id. 311. The court therefore held that because it was
undisputed that the plaintiffs accident occurred while he was using a vehicle that was furnished
or available for his regular use, summary judgment was appropriate. In reaching this conclusion,
the Colorado court found that the phrase "furnished for regular use" was not ambiguous because
"taken in its plain ordinary sense is easily understood to mean that no coverage exists on cars that
he or his family may have the right to use regularly."
\n Home Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 152 A.2d 115 (Del. Super. 1959), the court interpreted the
same "regular use" exclusion. In that case, the defendant and injured party, Kennedy, was an
employee of White Brothers Supply Company. This company furnished a pick-up truck to
defendant for his exclusive use in connection with the business. He was also permitted to drive
the truck to and from home and work. He had no authority to use it for personal or nonoccupational purposes. The truck was in his possession everyday and was used by him in the
business at least 6 days a week. It was generally kept parked in front of his house. The truck had
been in his continuous possession for approximately one year. Kennedy owned a Dodge
automobile which he and his wife used. This automobile was insured by Home Insurance
Company.
On February 2,1957, while operating his business vehicle on a business trip, he was
involved in an automobile accident. As a result of that, suit was filed against the tortfeasor and
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his company for personal injury and wrongful death. The suit against the employer was settled.
Kennedy then demanded that his own carrier take over the defense of the claims; his carrier
refused to do so, citing the "regular use" exclusion. A declaratory judgment action was filed.
"Defendant agrees that he would be excluded from coverage if the pick-up had been
furnished for his regular use." Id. 111. However, he argued that this term meant a use that was
"indiscriminate and unrestricted, full and complete use of the truck, and since his use of the truck
was restricted to a 'business use', it was not furnished to him for its 'regular use.'" Id. 111.
The court found that a private passenger automobile is covered as long it is "not furnished
to the insured on a regular basis." Id. 118. The court found it was "immaterial whether or not
the private passenger automobile, not regularly furnished, is used in the business or occupation of
the insured." Id. 118. Thus, the court concluded that this vehicle was furnished to Kennedy by
his employer for at least a year; that he had exclusive possession of the truck; that he used it
every weekday for work; and that he also used it to go to and from his place of work, a distance
of several miles daily, with the permission of the employer. On this basis, the court determined
that: "[t]his arrangement was no casual, intermittent or infrequent use of the truck, but a steady,
daily use of the vehicle. These facts show a 'regular use' by the defendant within the common
meaning of the term." Id. 119. The court then concluded that the truck was furnished for his
"regular use," so there was no coverage under the US AA policy.

18

Also, in Bringle v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., supra, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed
the interpretation of the "regular use" exclusion. In this case, the injured party was employed as
a carpet layer. This company owned five panel trucks which were regularly furnished to the
carpet laying crew for hauling equipment to various jobs. While returning from an installation
job, the plaintiff was involved in an accident while driving one of these vehicles. As a result, the
plaintiff sustained injuries for which he sought medical payments. The plaintiff maintained that
because he could only use the vehicle for business purposes and not for his personal use, it was
not furnished for his "regular use." He requested the court interpret the exclusionary provision to
mean that "before coverage may be denied, there must not only be a furnishing for the insured's
regular use, but the vehicle thus furnished must also be regularly used by him." The trial court
held that to sustain this contention would require "reading something into the policy that is not
there." Id. 881.
The court noted that plaintiff was employed by the carpet company that regularly
furnished him a vehicle to go to and from installations. The frequency of such use would depend
upon the number of installations. An important consideration was that the vehicle was furnished
whenever there was an installation to be done. In determining that the "regular use" exclusion
applied, the Iowa Supreme Court found that the plaintiff could use any one of five panel trucks
for the carpet laying job he was assigned; that he would have frequent use of the panel trucks
every time there were installations; that he had blanket permission to use these vehicles for

19

business purposes; that at the time he was using the vehicle for its intended business purpose;
and that the vehicle was in the area that it was expected to be used. Id. 883. Thus, the court
concluded that the vehicle was furnished for his "regular use." In reaching this decision, the
court stated that it found the provision to be unambiguous.
In addition, the court noted that:
The general purpose and effect of this provision of the policy is to give
coverage to the insured while engaged in the only infrequent or merely casual use
of an automobile other than the one described in the policy, but not to cover him
against personal liability with respect to his use of another automobile which he
frequently uses or has the opportunity to do so. More specifically the evident
intention of the limitation with respect to other automobiles is to prevent a
situation in which the members of one family or household may have two or more
automobiles actually or potentially used interchangeably but with only one
particular automobile insured. Id. 882.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Ledoux v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 262 N.W.2d 418
(Minn. 1978), upheld a "regular use" exclusion clause as well. In that case, the plaintiff, an
employee of Worthington Daily Globe, was involved in a collision while driving his employer's
vehicle in the course and scope of his employment delivering newspapers. Five days each week
plaintiff went to his employer's place of business, picked up an automobile owned by the
employer, and drove the vehicle to deliver newspapers to various locations. The employer's
vehicle was not available to plaintiff for any purpose other than delivering newspapers and had
never been used by him personally. The plaintiff was involved in an accident and sought
coverage under his personal automobile policy. The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action
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and then a summary judgment motion followed requesting interpretation of the "regular use"
exclusion.
Over the plaintiffs objection that the exclusion was ambiguous, the district court granted
summary judgment, finding that the policy was not ambiguous and coverage was not provided
because the employer's automobile was regularly and frequently used by the plaintiff and
therefore was not a "non-owned" vehicle as defined by the policy. With respect to the plaintiffs
claim the provision was not ambiguous. The court found that the words "furnished for regular
use" and the definition of "non-owned automobile" should be given their "ordinary and common
meaning." Id. All. The court was also of the opinion that "coverage must be restricted in order
to prevent the insured from driving a number of additional vehicles and claiming coverage for all
of them." Id. All. In this regard, the court pointed out that the plaintiff used his employer's
automobile for 15 hours per week over a period exceeding over a year. "The inferences to be
drawn reasonably from such facts lead to but one conclusion . . . as a matter of law that plaintiff
was regularly using his employer's automobile" and, hence, the provision excluded coverage. Id.
All.
The Virginia Supreme Court, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 383 S.E.2d 734
(Va. 1989), also upheld a "regular use" exclusion. In that case, Paul Jones was a salesman for
Southern Vending Company. The company furnished him a 1978 Ford van which he used daily
on his job. He was allowed personal use of the van if he got permission. He was involved in an
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automobile accident on April 30, 1984 while making deliveries for the company. He sought
coverage under Southern Vending's insurance policy, but claimed it was insufficient to pay his
medical expenses so he then sought payment under his personal insurance policy issued by State
Farm. That policy defined a non-owned automobile as "an automobile or trailer not owned by or
furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, other than a temporary
substitute automobile." Id. 735.
State Farm took the position that the van Jones was operating did not qualify for coverage
because it was furnished for his regular use in the course of his employment. Accordingly, they
refused to make medical payments. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial
court determined the van was furnished to Jones for employment purposes, not for his personal
use and, for this reason, the van was not "furnished for the regular use" of the insured, and Jones
qualified for coverage. State Farm appealed, claiming that the vehicle had been furnished for his
"regular use" and, therefore, it does not qualify as a "non-owned vehicle" and there would be no
coverage.
On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court noted that while Jones was required to obtain
special permission to use the vehicle for personal purposes, he operated the van every day over a
2-3 year period. He drove it over 300 miles a week and controlled the van an average of 6 days
or 70 hours each week. For that reason, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was
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reversed and State Farm's cross-motion for summary judgment was granted. In reversing the
trial court, the Virginia Supreme Court held:
An insurance company bases its policy and premium on its evaluation of the
frequency and opportunity for risk to produce a loss. Driving a car is the risk
covered in a personal automobile policy. The risk will obviously grow with an
increase in driving frequency, regardless of the purpose of the trips.... Id. 736.
The Texas Court of Appeals, in International Service Ins. Co. v. Walther, supra, also
upheld the "regular use" exclusion. In Walther, the plaintiff was injured in a truck-train wreck.
At that time, he was driving a truck owned by his employer, the Giddings Grain Company. As a
result of the accident, his medical expenses were more than the limit of the medical payment
benefits. He then sought coverage under his own policy. He referred to the definition of a "nonowned" automobile as one "not owned by or furnished for regular use." Walther tried the case
on the theory that his employer's truck was not furnished for his "regular use." The question
then was whether as a matter of law the truck was furnished for the regular use of Walther. If it
were, the insurance company had no liability.
The court noted that the undisputed facts showed that Walther was employed by the grain
company in 1962, and since July of 1965 was a feed delivery man. At the time of the accident,
the grain company owned three delivery trucks. Walther drove all three trucks when making his
deliveries. The size of the load determined the truck he selected. The trucks were garaged at the
grain company and he was not permitted to use them for personal missions. He used the trucks
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to make deliveries both around Giddings and out of town. The frequency of the trips depended
upon the amount of feed sold during the week. Under these facts, the court determined that:
The plan of medical payment coverage is to extend coverage to the insured while
he is occupying an automobile other than the one named in the policy if the other
automobile is not owned by him or furnished for his regular use. Such protection,
then is given to casual or infrequent occupancy of other automobiles than the
named automobile. It is regular double coverage that the 'regular use' clause
avoids. Id. 775.
The court also noted that the term "regular use" was not ambiguous, even though this
issue was not raised. In this regard, the court noted that:
The definition of 'non-owned automobile' not only excludes from coverage
vehicles 'regularly used,' but also those 'furnished' for the insured's regular use.
The words ' furnished for,' means to provide for, to supply, to afford, and to
provide what is necessary for.... The words, 'regular use' mean a use steady or
uniform in course, practice or occurrence, not subject to unexplained or irrational
variation. Id. 776.
The court found in favor of the plaintiffs insurance company, finding that the "furnished for
regular use" provision applied to bar coverage.
Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court in Kenney v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,
supra, also upheld a "regular use" exclusion, finding this provision to be unambiguous. Id. 221.
From the above, it is clear that "regular use" does not necessarily mean both for business
and personal use. Rather, its plain meaning suggests that the vehicle, for example, can be
provided for "regular use" in the course and scope of employment.
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B.

Incidental Use Does Not Void the "Regular Use" Exclusion
Other jurisdictions have held that an incidental use of a vehicle provided for business

purposes does not void the "regular use" exclusion. The cases cited below represent examples
where a vehicle was provided for business purposes and the individual deviated from that
purpose, yet the courts upheld the "regular use" exclusion.
For example, in Eddy v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., supra, the
petitioners, Daniel and Darcy Eddy, sought coverage under the underinsured and personal injury
protection provisions of their automobile policy. Their claims arose from an accident with an
uninsured motorist who crossed the center line and collided with their vehicle. Petitioner Daniel
Eddy had exclusive use of the company vehicle. At the time of the accident, he had been
drinking, which was in violation of company policy. For this reason, he maintained that he did
not have "regular use" of the automobile assigned to him. USF&G, the petitioners' insurer,
denied payment of the claims, citing the "regular use" exclusion. Mr. Eddy did not dispute that
the company vehicle was provided for his "regular use." However, he argued that because he had
consumed alcohol while using the company car, this nullified the "regular use" provision.
In response, the Washington Supreme Court referred to its opinion in Grange Ins. Ass 'n
v. MacKenzie, supra, where it defined regular use as "[exclusive use, necessarily constitutes
regular use, regardless of the purpose of that use...," as distinguished from the type of use not
excluded under the "other vehicle" exception as the "sporadic, isolated incidence of driving of a
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noncovered car." Id. 969. Applying this definition, the court found that "regardless how limited
his consumption of alcohol may have been when using the company station wagon, the vehicle
was furnished or available for his regular use within contemplation of the statutory language
permitting an exception to underinsured motorist coverage, and within the scope of the
exclusionary language in USF&G's policy." Id. 969. Specifically, they held that "He used the
vehicle every working day of his employment with AT&T until the accident. That Mr. Eddy
chose, apparently on one occasion, to violate his employer's rule of conduct does not alter the
conclusion that he was driving a vehicle provided for his regular use." Id. 969. See also
Federated Am. Ins. Co. v. Hargrove, 475 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1970); Abbott v. General
Accident Group, supra; and Drollinger v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 797 P.2d 540 (Wash. App.
Div. 3,1990) ("Regular use" exclusion is to prevent the purchase of insurance on one vehicle
with the intent it provide coverage for any vehicle being driven, and also to ensure that the
insurer's risk is not substantially increased without a corresponding increase in premium.)
The Illinois Appellate Court, in Economy Fire and Cas. Co. v. Gorman, 406 N.E.2d 169
(111. App. 4 Dist. 1980), decided similarly. In this case, defendant Gorman lived with his parents.
At the time of the accident he was working for Mummert's delivering prescriptions for about 2
months. His employer provided him a vehicle to be used for making the deliveries. His hours
were 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, and 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Saturday.
Many times during the week, he left at 8:00 p.m. to make deliveries and did not return until 8:30
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or 8:45 p.m. He was told to return the car to the store when he finished making deliveries and, if
no one was there, put the keys in the ashtray and lock the car. The car was never furnished to
him for his personal use and he was never given permission to use the car after working hours.
On the one occasion when he drove the car home instead of returning it to the store, the employer
notified the police.
On January 4,1978 he went to work as usual and made his deliveries. He left the store at
8:30 p.m. with 7 or 8 deliveries to make. He was not sure of the location of the street of his last
delivery, so he stopped at a friend's house between 9:00 and 9:30 p.m. Another friend who was
at the house rode with Gorman to show him where the street was. When the two returned,
Gorman's girlfriend and two other girls were there so he stayed for 30-45 minutes. Defendant
Link then asked him to give her a ride home and she and another girl rode with him in his
employer's car. He had taken one girl home, but Link was in the car with him when the collision
occurred.
Various arguments were advanced, but defendant relied upon his position that the
transporting of these women was incidental and not for business purposes and, as such, at that
time the vehicle was not furnished for his "regular use." In response to this argument, the court
held:
Here, the vehicle was furnished to Gorman, Jr. for his expected use throughout
each business day for the purpose of making deliveries. Obviously, his use was
not "incidental" and to have deemed his use of this vehicle to have been covered
by his parents' liability policy would have greatly increased the exposure on that
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policy without a compensating premium. We consider his use of the vehicle to
have been "regular" as a matter of law. Id. 173.
The above courts suggest that incidental side trips will not invalidate the "regular use"
exclusion.
C.
Driving Other Than an Assigned Vehicle Does Not Invalidate the "Regular Use9'
Exclusion
Other jurisdictions have held that driving one or more of an employer's vehicles does not
invalidate the "regular use" exclusion. In other words, as long as the vehicle being driven is
furnished for business purposes, it does not matter if the assigned vehicle is the one being driven.
In United Services Auto. Ass 'n v. Couch, 643 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), Mr.
Couch was a "part-time" employee whose duties included helping around the kitchen, cleaning
and delivering pizzas. A 1965 Chevrolet was available to him when he was working and when it
was not being used by another employee. Couch was involved in an accident while driving this
vehicle. He subsequently made a claim for benefits under his mother's USAA policy where he
was an additional insured. In response, USAA filed a declaratory judgment action asking the
court to interpret the "regular use" exclusion as precluding coverage. In looking at the "regular
use" provision, the court determined that "the issue of regularity hinges not so much upon the
regularity of the working time or the operator, but upon the regularity with which the vehicle was
furnished or available." Id. 672. Under the facts of this case, there was no dispute but that the
vehicle is regularly, i.e. constantly, available to the employees of the business, including Couch,
when he was working and, for that reason, the court determined the vehicle was regularly
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available to Couch within the meaning of the policy exclusion. In reaching its conclusion, the
court determined that:
The obvious purpose of the exclusion under discussion is to prevent abuse
of the "non-owned" privilege by unnecessarily burdening the insurer with liability
which ought to be covered by another insurance. For example, the exclusion
excludes the insured from coverage on a second vehicle which he has not insured,
or from coverage on a vehicle which insured has placed in the name of another in
order to "borrow" it and use it without paying additional premium for the
coverage.
Also, the purpose of the exclusion is to deny coverage to the insured while
using a vehicle as to coverage of which he has an opportunity to investigate. If a
vehicle is not regularly available to insured and if insured uses a vehicle only on
isolated occasions, it would not be expected that he inquire as to liability
insurance on the vehicle. If, however, insured is available to him or uses a vehicle
with any degree of regularity, it is expected that he would ascertain whether the
vehicle is covered by liability insurance and, if not, would arrange for suitable
protection for himself. Id. 672.
Finally, the umit determined that the purpose of the exclusion was facilitated because of
the regularity of the use by Couch and, therefore, the exclusion applied.
See also O 'Brien v. Halifax Ins. Co. of Massachusetts, supra, involving a police vehicle
in\ul I'd in .111 accident and a t Linn by the officer under his personal julonioltih policy. The
court denied coverage, finding the police vehicle was furnished for his "regular use." Further,
the court held that it does not matter whether the "insured's employer assigns him one specific
automobile for regular use or a number of automobiles, any one of which may be assigned for a
particular trip, the result is the same. An automobile is furnished to an insured 'for regular use'
in either event... we agree . . . there is no ambiguity in (In; policy...." Id. 308.
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In Hall v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 670 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App. 1984), the
plaintiff drove a truck for her employer, Allied Baggage Services. Two trucks were used in each
route but they were actually assigned to an individual. One day when plaintiff was working
overtime, she was assigned a truck which at the time was regularly assigned to another employee.
She had never used the particular truck or trailer before. She was involved in an accident while
driving this vehicle.. Southern Farm Bureau denied her claim, stating that the truck she was
driving was not a covered vehicle. The policy covered certain "owned" and "non-owned"
vehicles as defined in the policy. There was no dispute that the truck was not "owned" by Ms.
Hall, but by her employer. Because it was non-owned and furnished for her regular use, coverage
was excluded under the policy. The court noted that "the purpose of these provisions is to afford
coverage for occasional use of other vehicles, but to exclude the habitual use of other cars, which
would increase the insurer's risk without a corresponding increase in the premium." Id. 116111. As such, the insurer's motion for summary judgment was granted.
In granting summary judgment, the court held:
If an employee regularly drives a vehicle in his or her employment, and if the
driving of such a motor vehicle constitutes the principal duty of the employment,
and if a number of vehicles in a pool are available to that employee, subject to
either a random assignment or assignment based upon the nature of the job
involved, or a selection of the employee, then all vehicles in the pool are
considered as a matter of law to be vehicles furnished for the employee's regular
use. Id. 111.
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Finally, driving other than the assigned vehicle will not invalidate the "regular use"
exclusion.
D

Case Law Supports Farmers' Position that the "Regular Use" Exclusion Applies
H ie above cases delineate the various situatioi is wl lere the ''''regular use" exclusion was

applied to bar coverage. For example, there are cases which indicate that "regular use" does not
mean that it has to include both business and personal use but, rather, that business use is
sufficient. (See Cruz v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra; Home Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, supra;
Bringle v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., supra; Ledoux v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., supra; State
Farm Mut. Auto, In s. Co i Jones, supra; International Service Ins. Co, v. Walther, supra; and
Kenney v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., supra) In addition, there were circumstances in
which there were side trips made while the individual was driving the vehicle in the course and
scope of his employment Ii i. this regard, these courts foi ind tl lat 'these side trips were ii icidental
and did not void the "regular use" exclusion. (See Eddy v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins.
Underwriters, Inc., supra, and Economy Fire and Cas. Co. v. Gorman, supra.) Further, there
were cases where there was more than one vehicle used at the place of employment; yet, the
courts indicated that it did not invalidate the "regular use" exclusion if the individual was driving
other than their assigned vehicle. (See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Couch, supn i; O'Brien v.
Halifax Ins. Co. of Mass, supra; and Hall v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., supra.)

31

The undisputed facts, coupled with Valentine's admission that the vehicle was furnished
for her regular use, confirms that this exclusion applies to bar coverage. At the time of the
accident, Valentine had been working for Frank Edwards for approximately two months and was
driving a vehicle furnished for her "regular use" by her employer. She was delivering parts,
which was one of the duties she performed in the course and scope of her employment. She
regularly used that vehicle or, if it was not available, other vehicles also provided by her
employer. She worked 5 days a week, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. At the time of the accident,
she was delivering a part for her employer. As such, the "regular use" exclusion applies to bar
coverage. It follows then that the trial court was correct in their determination that the phrase is
not ambiguous and applies to bar UIM coverage for this loss.
POINT III
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOLLOWS THE VEHICLE,
NOT THE INDIVIDUAL
Valentine's arguments in the sections entitled "Utah's Motor Vehicle Insurance Code,"
"Component Parts of the Statutory Scheme," "Purpose and Policy," and "UIM Coverage Follows
and Protects the Person" will be addressed under this heading. At issue in this case is whether
Valentine is entitled to underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage. This issue turns on Utah's
Compulsory Insurance Law (U.C.A. §§31A-22-302(c) and 31 A-22-305(9)(a)(ii)), whether the
vehicle she was driving at the time of the accident was an insured vehicle under the policy, and
also whether the "regular use" exclusion applies.
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111IV1 coverage "is a facet of uninsured motorist coverage; its purpose to provide insurance
protection to the insured against damages caused by a negligent motorist as if the motorist had
another liability policy in the amount of the underinsured policy." USF&G v. Sandt, 854 P.2d
519, $li i

A' -

:

'

average is not i i landatory, bi it allows const imers to opt oi it in

writing. U.C.A. §§31A-22-305(9)(a)(ii) and 31A-22-302(c). As such, any exclusion to U M
coverage does not violate public policy. State Farm Mut. Auto v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 101 (J Jtah
2003).
Valentine maintains that UIM coverage is "floating personal accident insurance" which
does not attach to tl le vel iicle Foi tl lis reasoi I, she claims any restriction is void as against public
policy. Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. Co. of Missouri, 992 S.W.2d, 308, 313
(Mo. App. 1999). In taking this position, Valentine fails to realize that the Utah Supreme Court,
in Clark v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 122 7, 1229 (I Jtal I 1987),. determined tl lat
UM coverage "was intended to rest with the vehicle and not with the named insured." Id. 1229.
Clark involved a motor vehicle accident in which Clark, while driving a motorcycle, was
killed by an uninsured motorist. At the time, the motorcycle Clark was driving was uninsured,
but he had purchased insurance for his car from State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. Clark's
family n lade a den land for i minsi ired motor ist benefits under the policy insuring this vehicle.
This policy provided coverage if the vehicle involved in the accident was an "owned motor
vehicle" as defined by the policy. An "owned motor vehicle" is "a vehicle described in the
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declarations on the policy, temporary substitutes for those vehicles, and newly acquired
vehicles." Since the motorcycle was not an "owned vehicle," "under the terms of the contract,
the uninsured motorist clause did not apply to the motorcycle." Similarly, Valentine's policy and
the Utah statute provide that UIM coverage only applies to an insured vehicle as described in the
declarations.
In response, the Clark family argued that U.C.A. §§31A-22-302 and 31A-22-305 (1986)
"creates a personal right to uninsured motorist coverage and expresses a legislative statement of a
public policy that forbids exceptions to uninsured motorist coverage." Id. 1228. The Utah
Supreme Court rejected this position, citing U.C.A. §41-12-21.1 (1981) (repealed and now
codified in §§31A-22-302 and 31A-22-305), concluding that:
We do not think that the statute, which merely requires insurers to offer uninsured
motorist coverage and authorizes motorists to waive the coverage, evinces a
legislative intent to allow an individual to purchase insurance on one vehicle and
obtain coverage on all other vehicles in his household. . . . The legislative
requirement that the coverage be offered on any motor vehicle in the state
contradicts the Clarks' argument. If the legislature had intended to require
uninsured motorist coverage only on one vehicle per household, it would have
drafted the statute accordingly and would not have required the insurers offer the
coverage on all vehicles. Id. 1229.
Unlike Clark, who was driving an owned but uninsured vehicle, Valentine was driving a
"non-owned" vehicle. Nevertheless, in both situations, neither vehicle was an insured vehicle
because neither was described in the declarations of the policy. Also, in denying coverage, the
Utah Supreme Court in Clark, citing the "opt out" provision, concluded:
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• . . that the statutory provision allowing a motorist to waive uninsured motorist
coverage also requires a rejection of the Clark family's position. The legislature,
in drafting the statute in question, required that each insured be offered uninsured
motorist coverage, but simultaneously allowed each named insured to reject the
coverage. Thus, coverage was intended to rest with the vehicle and not with the
named insured, since owners can opt in favor of uninsured motorist coverage on
some vehicles and against it on others. Id. 1229,1230. (Emphasis added.)
See also Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App. 1989), wherein
the court also determined (in referring to UM coverage) that "the legislative enactment is
intended to rest coverage with the vehicle and not the named insured." Id. 1021.
Also, none of the cases relied upon by Valentine support her position that UIM coverage
is "floating persoi lal accident insurance." These cases have differei it statutes, policy language,
and are factually distinguishable. In some cases, Valentine relied on statutes where UIM
coverage is mandatory, unlike Utah's statute (U.C.A. §31A-22-305) where the insured can "opt
oi it" of UIM coverage. These cases it lclude: State Farm Mut, Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duran, 785 P.2d
570 (Ariz. 1989); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Martinson, 589 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 1999); Veness v.
Midland Risk Ins. Co., 732 N.E.2d 209 (Ind App. 2000) (in addition to having a statute making
UIM coverage mandatory, the case did not involve a non-owned vehicle and dealt with a
passenger on a motorcycle); Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. v. Gilbert, 791 P.2d 742 (Kan. App. 1990) (in
addition to having a stati ite making UIM coveragemandatoi j it did not inv oh e anon owned
vehicle); Dupin v. Adkins, 17 S.W.3d 538 (Ky. App. 2000); and Clark v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 577 N.W 2d ' 790 (Wise , 1998).
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Other cases relied upon by Valentine are distinguishable because they do not involve a
non-owned vehicle and also allow stacking (not allowed under Utah statute, U.C.A. §31A-22305(9)(e) or the Farmers' policy "other insurance" provision), selecting the highest limit, and
alluding to the insured's "reasonable expectations" (not adopted in Utah, see Randle v. Allen, 862
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). These include: Jones v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 723 A.2d 390 (Del.
Super. 1998); Squire v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 370 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (111. 1979) {Squire
also adopted the reasonable expectation test); and Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town & Country
Ins. Co. of Missouri, supra (dealt with stacking and reasonable expectations).
Finally, the following cases relied on by Valentine are factually distinguishable: Bass v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 196 S.E.2d 485 (Ga. App. 1973); Allstate v. Kaneshiro, 998 P.2d
490 (Ha. 2000); and Pentz v. Davis, 927 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1996). Bass involved an owned vehicle
not insured for UIM coverage and addressed whether UIM coverage could be obtained from
another owned, insured vehicle. Kaneshiro concerned issues where UIM coverage was never
offered. Finally, Pentz dealt with an issue of priority of payments among multiple vehicles for
which there was UIM coverage.
There is absolutely no support for Valentine's position that UIM coverage is "floating
personal accident insurance." Rather, the Utah statute, the Farmers policy, and case law clearly
provide that UIM coverage attaches to the vehicle, not the individual.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The case law relied upon by Farmers supports that the "regular use" exclusion K noi
ambiguous and, when applied to the facts of this case, bars coverage for UIM benefits. Similarly,
tl le stati itory and case law cited abo\ e clearly shows tl lat I. IIM coverage is not "floating personal
liability coverage," but rather is dependent on the vehicle driven. Furthermore, such a position
comports with public policy. For the above reasons, Farmers respectfully requests that the
decision of the Trial Court granting summary judgment be affirmed.
DATED this ^/^cfoy of August, 2005.

4iU^

/s%J

Barbara L. Maw
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
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ADDENDUM

CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
Propriety of automobile insurer's policy of
refusing insurance, or requiring advanced
rates, because of age, sex, residence, or handicap, 33 A.L.R.4th 523.
State regulation of motor vehicle rental
("you-drive") business, 60 AX.R.4th 784.
Umbrella or catastrophe policy automobile
liability coverage as affected by primary policy
"other insurance" clause, 67 A.L.R.4th 14.

31A-22-302

What constitutes "motor vehicle" for purposes of no-fault insurance, 73 AL.R.4th 1053.
Application of automobile insurance "entitlement" exclusion to family member, 25 A.L.R.5th
60.
Automobile insurance coverage for drive-by
shootings and other incidents involving the
intentional discharge of firearms from moving
motor vehicles, 41 A.L.R.5th 91.

31 A "-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insurance policies — Exceptions.
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall
include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and
31A-22-304;
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless
affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4); and
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless
affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(9).
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, except
for motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury
protection under Sections 31A-22-306 through 31A-22-309.
(3) (a) First party medical coverages may be offered or included in policies
issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators.
(b) Owners and operators of motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers are
not covered by personal injury protection coverages in connection with
injuries incurred while operating any of these vehicles.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-302, e n a c t e d b y
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 183, § 1;
1992, ch. 132, § 1; 2000, c h . 1, § 54; 2003, ch.
76, § 1; 2003, ch. 218, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Sub-

section 31A-22-305(9)(c)" for "Subsection 31A22-305(8)(c)" in Subsection (l)(c).
The 2003 amendments, both effective May 5,
2003, substituted "Section 31A-22-305(9)" for
"Section 31A-22-305(9)(c)" in Subsection (l)(c)
and subdivided Subsection (3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 2 0 0 1 U T 29,
24 P.3d 928.

ANALYSIS

Construction.
Insurance.
Liability of county.
Uninsured motorist coverage.
—Exclusionary clause.
Cited.
Construction.
Whether an insurance policy or combination
of policies was "purchased to satisfy the owner's
or operator's security requirement of § 41-12a301" hinges not on whether it actually satisfies
the statutory security requirement, but rather
whether it was purchased for the purpose of
satisfying the statutory security requirement.

Insurance.
Where the insurance policy on the rental car
was not a "policy of insurance or combination of
policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or
operator's security requirement of § 41-12a301," the coverage of t h a t policy was governed
by its own terms, and it was an "excess only"
policy which expressly excluded coverage of t h e
named insured's son. Arredondo v. Avis Rent A
Car Sys., 2001 U T 29, 24 P.3d 928.
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own
vehicles operated by permissive users, under
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31A-22-303

INSURANCE CODE

former law. See Foster v Salt Lake County, 712
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).
Uninsured motorist coverage,
—Exclusionary clause
Former § 41-12-21.1, which merely required
, *
j
.
I
insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage
J ,,
,
.
, ,
j?,
and authorized motorists to waive coverage, did
not require them to allow an individual to
purchase insurance on one vehicle and obtain
coverage on all the other vehicles in his household; a clause excluding such multiple coverage
is permissible. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co , 743 P2d 1227 (Utah 1987).
A policy that covered the insured for any
injury caused by an uninsured motorist, exeluding therefrom only uninsured "automoblles o w n e d b
"
y t h e insured, did not exclude
uninsured motonst coverage when the msured
was operating a motorcycle. Bear River Mut.
^
TXT ° , , cr.-rrvr»aj m m / T u u n*. A
T
Ins. Co. v. Wright,
770 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct.App.
IQQQ)
Cited m Neel v. State, 889 R2d 922 (Utah
1995), Universal Underwriters Ins Co. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Contract Law, 2001 Utah L.
Rev. 1031.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile
Insurance § 22 et seq.
C . J . S . - 6 0 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 223.
AX.R. - Validity and construction of "nofault automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d
229
Injury or death caused by assault as within

coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44
A.L.R.4th 1010.
Validity, under insurance statutes, of covera ge exclusion for injury to or death of insured's
f a ^ y o r household members, 52 A.L.R.4th 18.
m a t
c o n s t itutes "entering" or "alighting
from» v e h l d e withm
m e a n i n g 0 f i n s U rance policy> o r s t a t u t e m a n d a t i n g insurance coverage,
59 A.L.R.4th 149.

31A-22-303. Motor vehicle liability coverage.
(1) (a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21 and
Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under
Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a) shall:
(i) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose name the
policy was purchased, state that named insured's address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged, the policy period, and the limits of
liability;
(ii) (A) if it is an owner's policy, designate by appropriate reference
all the motor vehicles on which coverage is granted, insure the
person named in the policy, insure any other person using any
named motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of
the named insured, and, except as provided in Subsection (7),
insure any person included in Subsection (l)(a)(iii) against loss
from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within
the United States and Canada, subject to limits exclusive of
interest and costs, for each motor vehicle, in amounts not less
than the minimum limits specified under Section 31A-22-304; or
(B) if it is an operator's policy, insure the person named as
insured against loss from the liability imposed upon him by law
for damages arising out of the insured's use of any motor vehicle
not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and with the
same limits of liability as in an owner's policy under Subsection
(l)(ii)(A);
(iii) except as provided in Subsection (7), insure persons related to
the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship who
are residents of the named insured's household, including those who
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Ch. 188 (S.B. 189)
WEST'S NO. 2 85
MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE POLICY COVERAGE
AN ACT RELATING TO INSURANCE;
COVERAGE PROVISIONS.

AMENDING UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST

This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows:
AMENDS:
31A-22-305, as last amended by Chapter 158, Laws of Utah 1999
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 31A-22-305 is amended to read:
«

UT ST § 31A-22-305

»

31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.
(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or
guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, including those
who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or
owned by a self-insurer;
and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or operator
of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury to or
death of persons under Subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c).
Copr. © West 2 005 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
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(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a)(i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered
under a liability- policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence;
or
(ii)(A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required by Section
31A-22-304;
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection
of the deficiency;

(2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent

(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately
by the vehicle operator;

caused

(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is
disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with the
effective date of this act, continues to be disputed for more than 60 days;
or
(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability insurer
of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to the
extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty
association or fund.
(3) « + ( a ) + » Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22- 302(1) (b)
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death « - i n limits that at least equal the minimum bodily
injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 3 1 A - 2 2 - 3 0 4 - » .
« + ( b ) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy,
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer t h a t : + »
« + ( i ) waives the higher
«+(ii)

coverage;+»

reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage;

and+»

« + ( i i i ) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured
motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's
motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits
available by the? insurer under the insured's motor vehicle p o l i c y . + »
« + ( c ) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less than
the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under
Copr. © West 2005 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works

Page 3

UT LEGIS 188 (2000)
2000 Utah Laws Ch. 188 (WEST) (S.B. 189)
(Publication page references are not available for this document.)

Section 31A-22-304 . + »
« + ( d ) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that issuer of
the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different
uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer.+»
«+(e)(i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January 1,
2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the same
medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of uninsured
motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts
up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.+»
« + ( i i ) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured
motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle
liability policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+»
(4) (a) « + ( i ) + » Except as provided in Subsection (4) (b) , the named insured may
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that
provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a).
« + ( i i ) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that includes a
reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage.+»
« + ( i i i ) + » This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage
until the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that
liability insurer.
(b) « + ( i ) + » All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in
the business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor
vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their
students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for that purpose, by
purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist
coverage of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.
« - (i) - » « + (ii) + » This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an
injured covered person.
«-(ii)->X<+(c)+>X<-This coverage does not apply to an employee, who is injured
by an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy i s - » « + Uninsured motorist
coverage: + »
« + ( i ) is secondary to the benefits+» provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers'
Compensation A c t « - . - » « + ; + »
« + ( i i ) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;+»
«+(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation
Copr. © West 2005 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
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insurance;

and+»

« + ( i v ) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered
person has been made whole. + »
« - (c) - > X < + (d)+» As used in this Subsection (4):
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 63-30-2.
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-102.
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under
Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show
the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence
consisting of more than the covered person's testimony.
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles m a y not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident.
(b)(i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person as
defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii).
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is entitled to the
highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that
the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member.
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the
covered person is occupying.
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the
other.
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections
(1)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or using a motor
vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim
is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle
covered under the terms of the policy.
Except as provided in Subsection (6) or
(7), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes
uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage
benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered
person.
(b) Each of the following persons m a y also recover uninsured motorist benefits
Copr. © West 2005 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
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under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" as
defined in Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle;

and

(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is
not owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person,
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative.
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making subsequent
elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(8)(a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a vehicle,
the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability policy at
the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability
coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and general damages.
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include:
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same
policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2).
(9)(a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(c) provides
coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death « - i n limits of at least $10,000 for one person in any
one accident, and at least $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident-».
« + ( b ) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy,
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:+»
« + ( i ) waives the higher coverage;+»
« + ( i i ) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage;

and+»

«+(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured
motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's
motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage
limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+»
« + ( c ) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less
than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 for two or
more persons in any one accident. + »
Copr. © West 2 005 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
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« + ( d ) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that issuer of
the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests
different underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer.+»
« - ( b ) - > X < + ( e ) + » The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as
described in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8).
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability coverage
of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to,
combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of
the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the
injured person.
« - ( c ) - > X < + ( f ) + » (i) « - F o r new policies or contracts written after January 1,
1993, a - » « + A - f » named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302(1) (a) .
« + ( i i ) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage
and when it wouLd be applicable. + »
« + ( i i i ) + » This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage
until the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that
liability insurer.
« - (ii) - > X < + (g) + » In conjunction with the first « - three-» « + t w o + » renewal
notices sent after January 1, « - 1993-» « + 2 0 0 1 + » , for policies existing on
that date, the insurer shall «-notify the insured of the availability of
underinsured motorist coverage along with estimated ranges of premiums for the
coverage. The department shall provide standard language to be used by insurers
to fulfill the insurers' duty under this Subsection (9).-» «+disclose in the
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the
coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+»
« + ( i i ) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underinsured
motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle
liability policy limits or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.+»
(10)(a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor
vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is
described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy.
Except as provided in « + t h i s + » Subsection (10) , a covered person injured in a
Copr. © West 2005 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
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vehicle described in a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not
elect to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor
vehicle insurance policy under which he is a named insured.
(b)(i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident.
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as
defined under Subsection (10)(c)(i)(B).
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections
(1)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
« + ( c ) Underinsured motorist coverage : + »
« + ( i ) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers'
Compensation A c t ; + »
« + ( i i ) may not be subrograted by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;+»
«+(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation
insurance; a n d + »
«+(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered
person has been made whole.+»
« - (c) - > X < + (d) + » (i) Each of the following persons may also recover
underinsured motorist coverage benefits under any other policy in which they are
described as a "covered person" as defined under Subsection (1):
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an underinsured motor vehicle;

or

(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the
covered person's resident spouse, or th£ covered person's resident relative.
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of coverage.
(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection ( 1 0 ) « - (c) - > X < +
( b ) + » ( i ) (B)
is entitled to the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for
any one vehicle that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family
member.
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the
covered person is occupying.
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage m a y be set off against the
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other.
« - (d) - > X < + (e) + » A covered injured person is not barred against making
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
« + ( l l ) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle
underinsured motorist policy more than three years after the date of the last
liability policy payment. + »
Approved March 13, 2000
Effective May 1, 2000.
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